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Public Law
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Melvin G. Dakin*
During the term, the Supreme Court was presented with
another facet of the Boucher litigation,' the purpose of which
has been to establish as illegal the removal of Boucher and his
colleagues from their posts in the State Division of Employment
Security and to recover back pay. In the initial appeal 2 in 1954
the court ruled that the employees had been illegally removed
from their positions since they had not been given advance written notice of such removal as required by Civil Service Commission Rule XII, Section 2. Thereafter a second attempt to remove
Boucher and the others was made by the Administrator of the
Division. The legality of this second attempt to remove was
promptly appealed to the Civil Service Commission. While such
appeal was pending, Boucher and his colleagues brought mandamus proceedings in a district court seeking an order compelling payment of back wages during the period between the first
illegal removal and the second removal pending before the Commission. The Commission took the position, in the proceedings in
the district court, that the issue of back pay was pending before
it as part of the appeal from the second dismissal and hence that
a mandamus proceeding against the administrator was improper.
This suit was dismissed, but dismissal was reversed by the Supreme Court and the suit reinstated as proper.8 After a trial on
the merits, mandamus was ordered to issue and the Commission
appealed. For the second time (first on the appeal from dismissal of the mandamus suit on exceptions and again on appeal
from the judgment mandamusing payment) the court rejected
the Commission's plea of lis pendens, holding that the matter
before the Commission (illegality of the second dismissal) did
not involve the issue of back pay. This conclusion was reached
by the court by limiting the exercise of Commission jurisdiction
to order back pay, under Article 14, Section 15(0) (3) of the
Constitution, to those instances where there has been a lawful
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. State so rel. Boucher v. Heard, 232 La. 499, 94 So.2d 451 (1957).
2. Boucher v. Division of Employment Security of the Department of Labor,
226 La. 227, 75 So.2d 343 (1954).
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dismissal (preceded by proper advance notice) but where the
"cause" on which dismissal rests has not been sustained on appeal before the Commission. Since only the legality of the second
dismissal was under attack before the Commission and since the
first dismissal had been held illegal by the court, mandamus was
deemed proper to compel payment of wages for the interim
period. This seems clear enough since, failing a lawful dismissal,
the employees continued on the payroll until legally dismissed;
while contesting the legality of the second dismissal, they asked
for back pay only up to the time of the second dismissal.
To buttress the contention that the back pay issue was still
before the Commission, counsel argued further on the appeal
that the first dismissal was actually valid since Rule XII went
beyond the constitutional authority in requiring advance notice
in writing. This contention afforded the court a second opportunity to point out that the Commission has full rule-making
power and that, in exercising it so as to require advance notice
in writing of removals, it did not exceed its powers. Since the
court has consistently upheld the Commission rule with respect
to this requirement, 4 it is obvious that it also found the rule had
a "rational basis" in that it represented an attempt to assure
freedom from arbitrary action in the area of employee removal.
In the case of Day v. Department of Institutions,5 plaintiff
Day also emerged from lengthy litigation before the Civil Service Commission and the Supreme Court with an order awarding
her back pay as well as reinstating her in her former position.
Plaintiff Day was before the court at the 1955 term on appeal
from the Civil Service Commission on the ground that her appeal
to the Commission had been improperly dismissed as being untimely filed.6 She was a clerk in the Department of Institutions
and an elected member of the East Baton Rouge Democratic
Committee when an amendment to the Civil Service law classified her position with the state, effective July 1, 1953, and rendered it subject to the requirement that she not also hold elective
office. In August 1953 she took leave of absence from her state
job and while on such leave was informed of the Civil Service
proscription against holding an elective position. She was al3. State ex reL. Boucher
4. Day v. Department of
La. 775, 93 So.2d 1 (1957)
13 (1954).
5. 231 La. 775, 93 So.2d
6. 228 La. 105, 81 So.2d

v. Heard, 228 La. 1078, 84 So.2d 827 (1956).
Institutions, 228 La. 105, 81 So.2d 826 (1955) ; 281
; Young v. Charity Hospital, 226 La. 708, 77 So.2d
1 (1957).
826 (1955).
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leged to have resigned orally, effective September 1, 1953, from
her classified position. Thereafter, the Department of Institutions notified Civil Service of the resignation and her name was
removed from the payroll. Some two months later, in a conference with the Director of the Department, she denied having
resigned and indicated her readiness to return to work. Failing
in this move, she restated her position through counsel in January 1954 and in reply the Director stated that since her resignation the duties of her position had been merged with another and
that he did not propose to create a new position for her.
Within sixty days of this letter but some five months after
removal from the payroll, she filed her appeal with the Civil
Service Commission; the appeal was dismissed as untimely filed.
On her appeal to the Supreme Court, it was urged that the constitutional requirement of notification in writing of "cause" was
applicable to cases where an oral resignation was later disputed,
as well as to clear cases of demotion, dismissal, or discrimination. Rule XII, enacted by the Commissioner thereunder, was
deemed applicable as was Rule 13.2. 7 In Rule XII the Commission had provided that "in every case of removal

. .

the ap-

pointing authority or his authorized agent shall furnish the employee and the Director in advance of such action a statement in
writing giving explicit and detailed reasons therefor and shall
notify such employee of his right of appeal to the ...

Commis-

sion." In Rule 13.2 an employee was given thirty days from the
date of an alleged act of discrimination to apply for a Commission hearing. Interpreting the two rules together, the written
statement required in Rule XII was deemed by the court, in effect, to constitute the alleged act of discrimination and the date
of furnishing it the date from which the thirty-day period would
run. Since no such statement had been furnished to plaintiff
Day, the court found her right to appeal to the Commission
never had prescribed.8 The case was therefore remanded to the
Commission with directions to hear the appeal.
On remand, the Commission nonetheless regarded as still
open the question of whether plaintiff Day had been legally removed from the payroll and found the Director's letter of January 27, 1954, a sufficient statement in writing, coupled with the
oral resignation, to support the removal as of September 1, 1953.
Plaintiff Day's interviews with the Director in the interim be7. Louisiana Civil Service Rules 48. Rule XII, 13.2 (1954).

8. 228 La. 105, 115, 81

old 826, S.
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tween September 1, 1953, and January 27, 1954, were found by
the Commission to constitute "solicitations of re-employment"
rather than a "termination of her leave without pay"; hence no
back pay was deemed payable.
The present decision is on the appeal from that Civil Service
determination.9 The court, after reversing itself on rehearing,
held that the Commission had not followed the law of the case as
laid down on the previous appeal; that "law" was stated to be
that plaintiff Day had not been legally removed since she had
not been furnished with a statement in writing acknowledging
her resignation prior to her removal. This holding, said the
court, should have on remand governed both the procedural matter of hearing the appeal by the Commission and the substantive
issue on the merits of her right to reinstatement and back pay.
The finding of fact that plaintiff had not terminated her leave
without pay was reversed on the ground that, although a finding
of fact, it was arbitrary and capricious and hence subject to
being judicially set aside. 10 Plaintiff was ordered reinstated on
the payroll until such time as she should be legally removed
therefrom and awarded back pay from September 1, 1953.
The case of Fields v. Rapides Parish" involved an alleged
dismissal of a public school teacher with some twenty-five years
of service and with permanent status under the Teacher Tenure
Act.' 2 In the fall of 1946, plaintiff Fields did not appear for
duty because of illness and belatedly (one month after school had
opened) requested an emergency leave of absence for the school
term. (She was then in California and remained there for the
purpose of receiving medical treatment.) She received no reply
from her superintendent with respect to her requested leave. In
August 1947 she returned to Louisiana and informed her superintendent that she was able to resume her duties; at this time she
was told that she had never been granted a leave of absence and
that her failure to report for work in September 1946 constituted
desertion of her job, leaving her without claim to a position in
the Rapides Parish School System. No hearing was accorded
Mrs. Fields by the Board on the alleged ground that she had
abandoned her employment and was therefore not within the
protection of the Teacher Tenure Act 8 requiring the filing of
9. 231 La. 775, 93 So.2d 1 (1957).
10. Id. at 802, 93 So.2d at 6, 11.
11. 231 La. 914, 93 So.2d 214 (1957).
12. La. R.S. 17:441-444 (1950).
13. Id. at 17:443.
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written charges against her and the holding of a hearing prior
to a decision removing her from her position.
After amicable demands for reinstatement and back pay had
been unavailing, plaintiff resorted to suit; her first two suits
filed were dismissed on exceptions; the third was decided on the
merits, the trial judge rendering judgment in her favor for some
$14,700.00 in back pay and ordering her reinstatement to her
former position.
Before deciding the case on the merits the trial judge overruled two exceptions filed by the Board, one an exception of no
cause of action, alleging that she had been properly dismissed,
the second an exception of no right of action on the ground that
the husband, who had been substituted as plaintiff for the wife
on the theory that the rule of Houghton v. Hall14 and Succession
of Howell 5 required it, had no interest in his wife's rights under
the Teacher Tenure Act. On appeal, the judgment was annulled
on the ground that this latter exception should have been sustained by the trial judge. To reach this result, it was necessary
for the Supreme Court to overrule a decision of the First Circuit
Court of Appeal applying Houghton v. Hall and Succession of
Howell in a similar Teacher Tenure case and by which the trial
judge had deemed himself bound. 16
Plaintiff Fields then filed her fourth suit, which is the basis
of the present appeal. In this suit a plea of laches, which had
been overruled in the third suit, was again advanced by the
Board, the contention being that plaintiff Fields had delayed unreasonably in filing her third suit; no appeals had been taken
from dismissal on exceptions of either the first or second suit
and the third suit had been brought two years and eight months
after such dismissals. The judge trying the fourth suit sustained
the plea of laches and dismissed. This plea had also been urged
on the appeal of the third suit but was not passed on by the Supreme Court since the judgment was deemed null on the basis
of failure to sustain the exception of no right of action ;17 on this
appeal, plaintiff argued that the doctrine of laches was not applicable since the statute provided her with a year from the date
of a Board finding that she had been guilty of wilful neglect, incompetency, or dishonesty within which to appeal to a court of
14.
15.
16.
17.

177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
177 La. 276, 148 So. 48 (1933).
Riche v. Ascension Parish School Board, 200 So. 681 (La. App. 1941).
227 La. 290, 293, 79 So.2d 312, 315 (1955).
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competent jurisdiction for review of the Board finding.18 Plaintiff argued that the doctrine of laches had thus been rendered
inapplicable to suits for reinstatment under the Teacher Tenure Act and in effect that her right of action would not prescribe until she had a hearing before the Board and one year had
elapsed thereafter without application for court review. The
court found "nothing in the ... statutes indicating an intention
of the legislature to abolish the equitable doctrine of laches" and
affirmed the judgment of dismissal. 19
Against the background of the Fields decision, the interpretations given to the constitutional provision and Civil Service
Commission rules in the Day and Boucher cases2 0 will no doubt
engender very considerable interest among members of the.
teaching profession interested in safeguarding their notice and
hearing rights under the Teacher Tenure Act. An interpretation such as was given the Commission's Rule XII and 13.2,
which made the furnishing of a written statement the basis for
starting the thirty-day appeal period running, 21 seems an equally
necessary interpretation with respect to the Teacher Tenure
Statute's requirement of notice and hearing as starting the oneyear period within which a petition in court may be filed.
The decision in the first Day appeal, in which this interpretion was adopted by the court, was not argued in the Fields case.
Had it been, the court might then have had the task of reconciling its holding there that a statement of charges was sacramental to starting prescription running in removing a Civil
Service employee with tenure, with its holding in the Fields case
that the doctrine of laches overrode a failure to give notice and
hearing under the Teacher Tenure Act. There was of course no
need to consider laches in the Day case since the delay was not
serious and the position in contest had simply been abolished.2
In Fields, however, reconciliation might have become necessary
had the Day case been argued strongly. As it was, in the Fields
case the court could content itself, in applying the doctrine of
laches, with noting that plaintiff Fields "slept on her rights"
while she "well knew of her complete and final discharge"
18. LA.. R.S. 17:443 (1950).
19. 231 La. 914, 917, 93 So.2d 214, 216 (1957).
20. Day v. Department of Institutions, 228 La. 105, 81 So.2d 826 (1965);
231 La. 775, 93 So.2d 1 (1957) ; State es rel. Boucher v. Heard, 232 La. 499. 94
o.2d 451 (1957).
21. Day w. Department of Institutions, 228 La. 105, 81 So.2d 82 (1955).
22. See page 81 aupra.
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through various informal communications and through an answer filed in her law suit. 2 This hardly seems the notice and
hearing contemplated in a tenure statute designed to safeguard
teachers against arbitrary school board action.
In Cottingham v. Department of Revenue 24 the court had occasion again to apply to a Civil Service Commission finding of
fact the principle that "where the decision is based on substantial evidence the court may not consider the weight or sufficiency of the evidence" and to point out that "the burden of
proving arbitrary action in the discharge of the employee is on
'25
the employee.
The court refused to disturb the Commission's inferences of
unreliability and untrustworthiness drawn from an incorrect
answer given to an application inquiry as to whether applicant
had ever been arrested or convicted. The applicant had answered
"No" to the inquiry, either negligently or unintentionally, when
in fact he had been arrested and convicted of violating the Sunday Closing Law. The applicant had been removed from his position, in part on the basis of this incident.
Had the issue been one of law, or, as the court phrased it,
had there been "no real and substantial relation between the assigned cause for the dismissal of appellant and his qualifications
for the position in which he served," the court stated that it
26
would have annulled the administrative action as arbitrary.
Thus, whether the criterion used by the agency as cause for dismissal has a rational basis in the legislative objects and purposes
in creating the agency will be a matter of full review for the
court, even though initially formulated by the agency. The decision seems in keeping with the limited scope of review sought
for commission action in making their judgment final on the
facts with appeal only on "any question of law."
Likewise, in Jordan v. New Orleans Police Department27 the
court refused to disturb an administrative finding of fact. The
record contained facts tending to support either of two hypotheses: (1) that the police officer disciplined was drunk (the
appellant admitted he had taken two drinks of vodka) ; or (2)
23. 231 La. 914, 917, 93 So.2d 214, 216 (1957).
24. 232 La. 546, 94 So.2d 662 (1957).
25. Konen v. New Orleans Police Department, 226 La. 739, 741, 77 So.2d 24,

27 (1954).
26. 232 La. 546, 548, 94 So.2d 662, 665 (1957).
27. 232 La. 926, 95 So.2d 607 (1957).
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that he appeared drunk because of a blow in the face (he had
admittedly received the blow while attempting to apprehend suspected criminals while off duty). The court noted that it had
"repeatedly stated that the ruling of the Commission upholding
the dismissal of an employee would not be disturbed where there
was some evidence before such body to support its decision" and
that "this Court is without authority to examine into the question of the weight or the sufficiency of the evidence to establish
intoxication."
Does the court mean by this that it will never disturb findings of fact if there is some evidence to sustain the finding?
Or does it mean that it will not disturb such findings if reasonable men can differ as to the inferences to be drawn from the
established facts? If one again reverts to the opinion in Day v.
Department of Institutions,2 it would seem the latter, since
there was some evidence to support the inference there that
plaintiff Day was not terminating a leave of absence when she
appeared at the Director's office, there being evidence of a prior
oral resignation;29 presumably the court substituted its judgment in the Day case because any inference except that of "termination of leave" was arbitrary, i.e., reasonable men would not
differ on such an inference being the only one to be drawn.80
In Marchiafava v. Baton Rouge Fire and Police Service
Board8 1 the court reversed a district court for exceeding the
statutory scope of its review and for substituting its judgment
for that of the Board with respect to the penalty to be imposed
for engaging in political activity. The political activity, although
minor in character, was clearly established; on the basis of a
finding of such activity the Board thought itself required to remove permanently the employee from the service. Under a statute limiting judicial review to the issue of whether the Board
made its decison in good faith, the district court nonetheless
deemed itself free, on review, to order modification of the removal penalty to some lesser penalty on the ground that the
political activity proved was not "just cause" for the penalty of
removal. The Supreme Court construed the statute and was per28. 231 La. 775, 93 So.2d 1 (1957).
29. Id. at 777, 93 So.2d at 4.
30. This would usually be the basis for judicially overturning an administrative finding of fact under the substantial evidence rule as applied in the federal,
courts. See Comment, Substantial Evidence on the Record Considered as a Whole
12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 290, 298 (1952).
31. 96 So.2d 26 (La. 1957).
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suaded that the dismissal was required by the statute, political
activity having been established. However, it held the district
court must be reversed in any event since lack of good faith
had not been established and this issue was the only one open
to it.82

In State ex rel. Magnolia Park,Inc. v. Louisiana State Racing
Commission,38 there was drawn in question the rule-making
powers of the Commission as well as the validity of action taken
under its licensing powers. The statute providing for legalized
horse racing, after vesting specific duties in the Commission,
further authorizes the Commission "to make rules and regulations for the holding, conducting, and operating of all race
tracks, race meets, and races held in Louisiana, provided such
regulations are uniform in their application and effect. 3 4 Under
this provision, the Commission formulated its Rule 22K, pursuant to which thoroughbred racing was authorized in the daytime and standardbred harness racing in the nighttime. 5
Faced with two applications for night thoroughbred racing,
one of which was later sought to be amended into an application
for day racing, the Commission rejected one application both
as an application for night racing as well as day racing and
granted the other application for night thoroughbred racing.
Rule 22K, providing for only harness racing at night, was not
formally repealed prior to this action; the question was thus
squarely posed as to the power of the Commission to modify its
rules in the course of passing on applications. For a majority of
the court the answer was clear: "when the Commission took
action contrary to the rule, it simply rendered the rule, which
could have been repealed at any time no longer operative."3 6
(Emphasis added.) There was dissent from this holding, as well
there might be, since the rule-making (and unmaking) process
is thus stripped of any safeguards except those which the Commission itself may choose to surround it with. It is apropos to
note that under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act there
would have been required a notice of rule-making to interested
parties and an opportunity required to be afforded such parties to submit views unless the agency found (and incorporated
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 29.
231 La. 720, 92 So.2d 699 (1957).
LA. R.S. 4:147(6) (1950).
Louisiana State Racing Commission Rules, Rule 22K.
231 La. 720, 731, 92 So.2d 699, 703 (1957).
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such finding and its basis in the rules issued) that such procedures were impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest.3 7 This federal provision obviously contains at
least the minimum requirement that a federal agency must make
a considered decision as to whether public or ad hoc rule-making
shall be utilized and must publicly justify that decision. The
Model State Administrative Procedure Act provides that "prior
to the adoption of any rule authorized by law, or the amendment
or repeal thereof, the adopting agency shall as far as practicable,
publish or otherwise circulate notice of its intended .action and
afford interested persons opportunity to submit data or views
orally or in writing.

's 8

Having decided that the agency had the power to change its
rules ad hoc, the court further found there was nothing in the
record "to indicate that they did not act in accordance with
what they thought was the best interest of the public in granting
one application and denying another," noting that "where a discretion is vested in an adminstrative board, courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of an administrative body." One
member of the court, in dissent, found nothing in the statute
granting rule-making power in connection with licensing; even
if granted, he would have found the statute unconstitutional as
containing no standards for guiding the agency in making rules
pursuant to granting and denying licenses. The majority found
such rule-making power and also found the limiting standard
of the "public interest" was impliedly contained in the act. The
dissenting member of the court would also have found a gross
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission both with
respect to its interpretation of the statute and its findings of
fact thereunder.

Local Government
Alvin B. Rubin*
IMPLIED LIMITATIONS ON MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY
Even a municipal ordinance clearly within the power conferred upon the municipality by its charter may be invalid if
the ordinance is contrary to a state statutory provision or if the
37. 5 U.S.C. §1003 (1952).
38. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
F9RM STATE LAWS 329, 330. § 2(3) (1944).
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